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Andrej PETROVIC, Ivana PETROVIC, Inner Purity & Pollution in Greek Religion. Volume 1: Early
Greek Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016. 1 vol. 15,8 × 24 cm, xvi+337 p. ISBN :
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1 This monograph traces the concept of ‘inner purity’ through time. Its main argument is
that, when approaching gods and engaging in rituals, a worshipper’s inner stance, i.e. his
attitudes  and  thoughts,  rather  than  just  the  outward  correctness  of  the  ritual
performance, are what matters. The correct inner stance of the worshipper was often
formulated  in  Greek  literature  in  terms  of  purity  of  mind,  soul  and  thoughts (‘the
“purity” of psychic or noetic organs or processes’, p. 5). Crucially, this concept of inner
purity ‘possessed a moral dimension’,  which was a pivotal aspect of the Greek purity
doctrine (p. 8). Inner purity was ‘an integral part of the Greek notion of piety and an
elementary prerequisite for successful interaction with the gods’ (p. 4).
2 While  previous  scholars,  such  as  Parker,  Chaniotis  and  others1 have  traced  the
‘emergence and subsequent development of  the moral  aspect of  Greek purity beliefs’
(= inner purity), A. and I. Petrovic (A.I.P.) argue that such a concept was there from the
beginning:  ‘it  was  an  element  of  the  purity  system  which  is  as  old  as  our  earliest
attestations of the system itself’ (p. 25).
3 In their investigation, A.I.P. also wish to shed light on the ever-elusive notion of ancient
Greek ‘belief’. This is possible, in their view, because worshippers’ inner purity contained
a reflective element: ‘inner purity as a category … is often associated with the acceptance
of  and  compliance  with  specific ethical  and  religious  values,  especially  morality,
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righteousness and justice, and it can also pertain to the recognition of the specific nature
and powers of  individual  divinities,  or to contemplation on the significance of  ritual
action’ (p. 5).
4 A.I.P.  provide  a  survey  of  textual  evidence  for  their  hypotheses,  close-reading  the
relevant passages and discussing them in their broader textual and cultural contexts. The
approach is both diachronic and synchronic (focusing in most cases on one author per
chapter, and then ordering the chapters chronologically, A.I.P. are able to study how the
concept changes, but are also sensitive to the coexistence of different ‘subsystems’). A.I.P.
have chosen for  a  narrow focus,  restricting their  discussion only  to  passages  ‘which
explicitly  deal  with  the  inner  states  of  ritual  performers’  (p. 36).  Even so,  the  sheer
amount of relevant passages has led them to opt for a division of the material into two
volumes:  the  first  (present)  volume dealing with the evidence until  the  early  fourth
century, and the second (still  under construction) treating the material from Plato to
Iamblichus (a motivation of the chronological cut-off point is found at p. 9–10).
5 After the Introduction, the main body of text is divided into five book-parts and twelve
chapters,  respectively  treating  epic  (Hesiod),  pre-Platonic  philosophy  (Pythagoras;
Heraclitus; Empedocles), literature in a sympotic setting (Xenophanes; the Theognidea),
drama (Aeschylus; Sophocles; Euripides; Aristophanes), and the evidence of the ‘Orphic’
gold leaves. The presentation of the argument in these chapters is crystal clear. Each
chapter  is  preceded  by  a  detailed  summary  of  its  main  points.  All  passages  are
accompanied  by  translations;  A.I.P.  are  sensitive  to  specific  syntactic  or  semantic
interpretative problems where they occur and explain them succinctly with insightful
clarity. Helpful overviews of, and pointers to previous scholarship on difficult topics and
complex  texts  are  provided.  The  conclusion contains,  among other  things,  a  tabular
overview of the relevant Greek passages per chapter. A glossary, defining the main Greek
lexemes involved, informs those who are less familiar with the semantic fields of piety,
purity and pollution.2 Finally, there is a helpful index locorum and an index nominum et
rerum. In these ways, A.I.P. show precisely what evidence they have, how they build their
argument, and where they stand in respect to previous scholarship. Given the richness of
the argument in each chapter, this book would merit a review article. In a brief review
such as this one, I  will  restrict myself to responding to a few selected aspects of the
argument.
6 My first point concerns Hesiod. A.I.P.’s main contention, that the idea of purity of the
mind can be  traced back as  far  as  Hesiod,  is  presented as  resting  primarily  on one
Hesiodic passage about a ritualistic river crossing. This passage is rather difficult to make
sense of. The text states that ὃς ποταμὸν διαβῇ κακότητ’ ἰδὲ χεῖρας ἄνιπτος, ‘whoever
should cross the river, unwashed with respect to badness and hands’ (the gods resent him
afterwards and give him trouble).3 A.I.P. interpret this as a zeugma (following West), with
κακότητα  and  χεῖρας  as  accusatives  of  respect  with  ἄνιπτος,  respectively  taken
metaphorically and literally. Their discussion is excellent, and this is probably the best
possible textual solution. But it is still unsatisfactory, since it does not make much sense.
‘Impure hands’ works fine, but ‘unwashed with respect to badness’ seems awkward and
pleonastic. A.I.P.’s main point about the Works and Days (κακότης is located in one’s νοῦς; 
moral badness is conceptualized in terms of impurity; with an impure mind, one cannot
successfully perform a ritual) is convincingly argued, but it is unfortunate that such a
pivotal passage should be so awkward semantically.
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7 A second passage, discussed in the same chapter on p. 45 and p. 47, might perhaps be
promoted  to  the  status  of  primary  evidence.  Perses  is  reminded  that  Zeus  passes
judgment  on  ‘those  for  whom bad  transgression  and  wicked  deeds  are  an  object  of
attention’  (οἷς  δ’ ὕβρις  τε  μέμηλε  κακὴ  καὶ  σχέτλια  ἔργα). 4 Subsequent  lines  of  text
explain in more detail to Perses what sorts of transgressions may be envisaged and what
happens to sinners. But all of this is then contrasted with the injunction to Perses that he
should sacrifice ‘purely and cleanly’ (ἁγνῶς καὶ καθαρῶς). 5 In Chapter 10, A.I.P. argue
about another passage that it ‘establishes a diametrical opposition between the morally
good (those who love τὸ ὅσιον and τὸ δίκαιον) and the polluted, which lays bare that
those who are morally good are perceived as pure’ (p. 233). The same reasoning, but in
the opposite direction may be relevant to the Hesiodic passage: the contrast between the
morally dubious (for whom bad ὕβρις is an object of thought) and those who sacrifice
cleanly and purely, implies that a bad attitude is perceived as impure.
8 That the tragedians used, and played with the notions of inner purity and pollution is
presented  in  a  way  that  is  completely  convincing.  A.I.P.’s  discussions  of  well-known
passages provide a new and fascinating view on this material. Still, it would be interesting
to learn A.I.P.’s view on the status of some of the presented passages as evidence. For
example,  in  a  passage  in  Aeschylus’  Suppliants,  the  Aegyptids  are  accused  of  being
δολιομήτιδες δυσάγνοις φρεσίν ‘having treacherous intentions in their impure minds’.6 As
A.I.P. explain, this passage contains various (probable) coinages. Before and after this
accusation,  the  Danaids  throw  out  an  avalanche  of  existing  or  novel  religious
disqualifications. A.I.P. cleverly argue (p. 272–273) that the word δυσάγνος was perhaps
coined by Aeschylus (as opposed to existing ἀνάγνος), to refer to the Aegyptids’ wrongful
attitude towards purity, rather than an absence of purity, since they lack respect for ritual
altogether. So, the accusation of inner pollution is there, but in an unexpected way, and it
occurs in a rather marked poetical context full of lexical inventions. Does that matter,
and  if  so,  how?7 A  similar  question  arises  from the  discussion  of  Phaedra’s  famous
utterance in Euripides’ Hippolytus (discussed on p. 202). When Phaedra claims that her
mind  has  some  pollution,  the  nurse’s  response  is  remarkable,  since  it  points  to  an
apparent failure to understand what Phaedra means: μῶν ἐξ ἐπακτοῦ πημονῆς ἐχθρῶν
τινος; ‘You don’t mean through spells that have harmed you, from one of your enemies,
do you?’8 In other words, the nurse wonders whether her mistress refers to sorcery,9 but
is ready to reject the hypothesis (cf. the particle μῶν). Is it relevant that the internal
interlocutor is presented as not readily grasping the idea of a ‘polluted mind’? Or is it
not?
9 A final point concerns the notion of ‘embodied cognition’. A.I.P. explain this notion on
p. 205 in some detail, suggesting that it could help us understand one particular dramatic
passage. Embodied cognition means that humans understand experiences of an abstract
nature (metaphysical, emotional, moral concepts) in terms of experiences of the body.
Describing moral behaviour as if it were akin to cleanliness and purity is, therefore, more
than a figure of speech; humans actually grasp and experience moral virtue as if it were
akin  to  physical  cleanliness.10 A.I.P.  quote  modern,  experimental  studies  which
demonstrate  that  point.  In  my  view,  this  notion  of  embodied  cognition  is  actually
relevant to the book as a whole, and employing it more broadly in the context of their
discussion could provide a strong argument for their main point. If the understanding of
moral thought, attitudes and mindsets in terms of mental purity is in fact part and parcel
of human cognition, then that explains why, and proves incontestably that such thinking
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can be indeed found from the dawn of Greek literature. Moreover, incorporating this
view would, to some extent, make the question of whether inner purity and pollution are
metaphorical  or  not  (as  discussed  on p. 288–291)  superfluous,  since  one  could  argue
instead that humans essentially conceptualize the metaphysical concept of ‘morality’ in
terms of purity.
10 Very minor problems seemingly occur on p. 242 in the translation of  ἁγνήν,  |  ἱερὰν
ὁσίοις μύσταις χορείαν,11 where it seems to me that it is not the dance which is qualified
as hosios, ‘religiously correct’, but rather the initiates; and on p. 66 and in the Conclusion,
where the correct transcription of the Greek relating to the ‘soul pursuing purity’ seems
to be psyche hagneuousa, corresponding to the original text quoted on p. 55, instead of
psyche hagneusa.
11 Tracing an ancient concept in the textual sources is difficult and energy-consuming, for
one cannot easily get to the relevant passages by performing lexical TLG searches. This
makes such a study highly valuable for colleagues in the field. In this case, given that
most scholars today do not even acknowledge the existence of  the concept of  ‘inner
purity’  in  early  Greek  literature,  or  its  relevance  to  the  notion  of  piety  and  ritual
performance, this specific treatment of the archaic and early classical passages is truly
new, and as a whole, entirely convincing.
NOTES
1. R. PARKER, Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion, Oxford,1996 [1983], p. 322–327;
A. CHANIOTIS, “Reinheit des Körpers — Reinheit des Sinnes in den griechischen Kultgesetzen,” in J. 
ASSMANN and Th. SUNDERMEIER  (eds.),  Schuld,  Gewissen und Person,  Gütersloh,  1997,  p. 142–79;  A. 
CHANIOTIS, “Greek ritual purity: From Automatisms to Moral Distinctions,” in P. ROESCH and U. 
SIMON (eds.), How Purity is Made, Wiesbaden, 2012, p. 123–139.
2. A.I.P. follow  Mikalson’s  translation  (J.D. MIKALSON,  Ancient  Greek  Religion,  Chichester, 20102
[Malden, MA 2005]; J.D. MIKALSON, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy, Oxford, 2010) of ὁσιότης
as ‘religious correctness’ and point out that Mikalson is omitted from my own discussion of this
term (S. PEELS, HOSIOS. A Semantic Study of Greek Piety, Mnemosyne Supplement 387, Leiden, 2016).
In the published version of my book (A.I.P. saw the earlier doctoral dissertation), I have treated
Mikalson’s interpretation in some detail (e.g. p. 6–8, 9, 70–71, 83–84). My own interpretation of
ὁσιότης as  ‘piety’ or  ‘that  which  pleases  the gods  (acknowledging  and  honouring  gods  by
respecting ritual  norms and upholding specific  ethical  values  that  matter  to  gods)’,  would,  I
suggest, actually fit well into the argument of A.I.P., given their emphasis on piety being based on
attitudes  and  compliance  with  religious  and  divinely  sanctioned  social  norms,  rather  than
‘correctness’ of actions of worshippers. I  argue that ‘religious correctness’ is only part of the
semantic range of ὅσιος.
3. Hesiod, Works and Days, 740–741.
4. Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  238.  Cp.  verse 531,  where  the  same verb  is  used  with  an  explicit
reference to the seat of thought: πᾶσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ τοῦτο μέμηλεν, confirming that μέλω refers to
a mental process in this text.
5. Hesiod, Works and Days, 336–337.
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6. Aeschylus, Suppliants, 750–751.
7. In the brief chapter on Aristophanes, A.I.P. convincingly argue that the ban of anyone whose
‘thoughts are not clean’ (in Aristophanes, Frogs, 355) is part of a parody of a prorrhesis of the
Eleusinian Mysteries; and also, that it is a comic play on the frequent emphasis in tragedy that
purity  of  mind  is  necessary  for  successful  communication  with  gods.  Making  jokes  about  a
concept, in the context of a mass media performance, seems the ultimate proof that that concept
is firmly established. As such, the chapter on comedy is in my view particularly strong. Is the
Aeschylean passage similar, twisting a more ‘established’ notion of an impure mind (and thus
showing it is well-established)? Or conversely, is the notion of an ‘impure mind’ part of the ‘new’
inventions in this passage?
8. Euripides, Hippolytus, 317–318.
9. Parker, o.c. (n. 1), p. 222.
10. Cf. G. LAKOFF &  M. JOHNSON,  Metaphors  we  live  by,  Chicago,  1980;  G. LAKOFF  &  M. JOHNSON, 
Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought, New York, 1999. 
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